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Abstract
We analyze the response of municipalities to the occurrence of natural disasters (earth-
quakes) in Italy, in terms of spending behavior, use of upper tier transfers and recovery.
We find evidence of increasing expenditure for about 12 years after the shock, with asym-
metric responses between matching (earthquake-related) and unconditional grants, and
heterogeneous flypaper effects across the country. While in Northern municipalities ex-
penditure tends to regress to pre-treatment levels, i.e., before the earthquake occurrence,
Southern municipalities react to the drop of grants showing inertia in expenditure lev-
els. This evidence is coupled with a faster recovery of private income and housing prices
in Northern municipalities. Our analysis exploits balance sheet data of about 8000 mu-
nicipalities for the period 2000-2015 and encompasses the universe of earthquake events
defined using alternative intensity measures. We apply a matching approach to disentan-
gle earthquake-related grants (mostly matching grants) from other grants, and to define
a control group of non-treated municipalities. The spatial and temporal variation in ex-
penditure and transfers between treated and not-treated governments are then examined
using panel data models on the universe of municipalities as well as on a matching sample
of municipalities.
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1 Introduction
Natural disasters have several implications on affected economies and society. In-
frastructures get damaged and need to be repaired, people get injured or die, economic
activities are unable to operate and inequalities may worsen (Bui et al., 2014; Kahn, 2005;
Stro¨mberg, 2007). Whether it is because of legal rules, solidarity or to raise the consensus
of the electorate, public authorities commonly intervene by means of higher spending levels
and transfers of financial resources from the central government to disaster areas (Barone
and Mocetti, 2014; Noy and Nualsri, 2011).1 It has been noted that expenditure on post-
disaster relief is generally less efficient and effective than expenditure on prevention (Healy
and Malhotra, 2009; Skoufias, 2003). However, governments prefer to deal with disaster
relief measures since the electorate is more likely to perceive (or misperceive) the benefits
and, therefore, to provide political consensus (Zaman et al., 2010). Despite the involve-
ment of local authorities and their role as the main channel of interaction between citizens
and regional/central governments to face natural disasters, there is lacking evidence on
the response of local public expenditure in terms of resources use and timing, and the
subsequent impact on recovery (Bevan and Cook, 2015).
This paper investigates the response of local government expenditure to natural dis-
asters exploiting detailed data on expenditure and transfers from the universe of Italian
municipalities for a 16-year period (2000-2015), and a large historic data set of seismic
events since 1000 AD. To this aim, we estimate expenditure variation following earthquake
occurrence using panel data regression models on the universe of municipalities as well as
on a matching sample, focusing on immediate and medium-run effects of earthquakes.
Further, we exploit the variability in transfers received for earthquake damage recovery
to identify a possible source of inefficiency in post-disaster interventions, i.e., the overre-
action to transfers from upper tiers to lower government levels that can offset the growth
of income - the so called flypaper effect (see e.g., Gennari and Messina, 2014; Hamilton,
1983). Due to their essential matching-grants nature and their duration, the response to
earthquake-specific transfers may be more pronounced as compared to other sources of
transfers, implying both an income and a substitution effect (Bailey and Connolly, 1998)
and leading to persistent path-dependency of local governments expenditure over time.
1In Italy - a country frequently struck by earthquakes - the central government allocated almost 100
billion Euro at 2014 prices to fund disaster relief just for the five largest seismic events that occurred
between 1968 and 2002 (Di Giacomo, 2014).
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We apply a matching procedure to disentangle different types of grants and explore dif-
ferences in the response to earthquake-specific and general grants. Then, we investigate
the asymmetric responses to increasing and decreasing grants and between Northern and
Southern municipalities in terms of resources allocation and recovery.
We find that an earthquake increases local government expenditure immediately after
the shock by about 2%, following an inverse U-shaped trend, which persists for about 11-12
years since the disaster. This increase is mainly driven by transfers of financial resources
from the central and regional governments. Further, we find evidence of flypaper effects
with asymmetric responses to matching (earthquake-related) and unmatching grants and
to increasing and decreasing grants. Finally, we testify differences in the response of
Northern and Southern municipalities, suggesting that the less efficient use of earthquake-
specific grants by Southern municipalities lead to poor economic outcomes.
Despite the size of public resources employed in the recovery from losses of natural
disasters and the long-lasting effort of public authorities, only a few studies analyze the
response of public expenditure to natural disasters and its impact. Melecky and Raddatz
(2011) investigate the effect of natural disasters on fiscal sustainability using data on a
number of high and middle-income countries for the period 1975-2008, and show that
public expenditure grows to allow for recovery. Noy and Nualsri (2011) find that govern-
ments of developed countries tend to support more disaster areas by means of transfers of
financial resources, while governments in developing countries are less committed or even
contract the resources transferred to disaster areas. Other studies focus on the impact of
natural disasters on economic growth and show that economic gains are context related
(e.g. Barone and Mocetti, 2014; Cavallo et al., 2013; Skidmore and Toya, 2002). Looking
at two Italian regions struck by severe earthquakes in 1976 and 1980, Barone and Mocetti
(2014) show that in the medium-run (i.e., the first 5 years after the disaster) transfers from
the central government allow to entirely cover the losses, but remarkable differences are
observed between the two regions in terms of ability to recover. Hornbeck and Keniston
(2017) find that Boston city reconstruction after the 1872 fire is an example of successful
recovery with beneficial effects on land and house values and urban growth, while Horwich
(2000) finds that the port of Kobe in Japan, struck by a severe earthquake in 1995, was
able to recover from damages within one year, but economic growth slowed down because
part of economic activities moved to other port cities.2
2Note that Horwich (2000) uses information on 19 months after the disaster. This does not exclude that
the area could have recovered from economic damages in the long-run, as found by Davis and Weinstein
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Our analysis contributes to a deeper knowledge of the effects of post-disaster public
spending, which helps policy makers to design more effective and efficient relief measures.
Usually, natural disasters affect a limited area of a country and, even if an event is not
catastrophic, damages may be remarkable at local level. Hence, observing the conse-
quences of these events from a within-country perspective may improve the precision of
the analysis. The large majority of studies mentioned above focus at country level and
analyze the economic impact of the largest natural disasters, neglecting smaller but harm-
ful disasters. Clearly, cross-country studies can only exploit a limited number of rare and
big events, which may undermine the validity of the results. Our approach allows to cap-
ture the effects of relatively small events since we exploit data for the universe of Italian
municipalities and a unique historic data set of all seismic events. Italy is an ideal setting
because the country was struck by several hundreds of earthquakes over the last decades,
out of which only 19 were large catastrophic events.3 Moreover, local governments are
responsible for housing services, urban road maintenance, economic development, social
protection and education, all aspects that are likely affected by catastrophes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
setting and how public authorities respond to natural disasters. Section 3 presents the
data and some descriptive evidence on the incidence of earthquakes and changes in public
expenditure. Section 4 defines the empirical strategy and Section 5 presents the main
results on expenditure behavior and provide some robustness checks. In Section 4.2, we
extend the analysis to investigate the role of transfers, and in Section 5.3 we explore
differences in the response to earthquakes, i.e. asymmetric responses to increasing and
decreasing grants and heterogeneous flypaper effects across municipalities. Finally, in
Section 5.4, we further explore differences in the response of Northern and Southern local
governments in terms of timing and spending composition, and the effects on economic
growth. Section 6 concludes.
(2002) after city bombings in Japan during World War II.
3Our elaboration on data provided by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED) (Guha-Sapir et al., 2017).
3
2 Institutional and seismic background in Italy
2.1 Exposure to earthquake risk
Italy is a country with a high frequency of earthquakes. The country is almost contin-
uously exposed to minor earthquakes and several large events occurred both recently and
in the past. However, it is necessary to distinguish the physical strength of an earthquake
from the damages it causes. A very strong earthquake that occurs in a not populated area
without infrastructures may not cause any damage, while a mild earthquake that strikes
a town with weak infrastructures may cause human losses and large damages. The 2017
earthquake of Ischia was a relatively weak earthquake (moment magnitude 4), but very
destructive because of poor building standards present in the area. This distinction is of
relevance also because Italy is rich in cultural heritage, which is difficult to protect against
natural disasters.
Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of earthquakes with intensity equal or bigger than 5 at
municipality level for the period 1985-2015. Intensity 5 is the lowest level at which damages
occur (see Section 3.2 on earthquake measurement for details). The map highlights that
earthquakes occur across the entire country. One-third of municipalities were struck at
least once by a seismic event over the considered period and almost half of them in the
period 2000-2015. The areas most frequently affected are the regions Emilia-Romagna in
the North, Umbria, Marche, and the municipality Rome in the Center, Abruzzo, Basilicata,
Northern Puglia and Eastern Sicily in the South.
The exposure to earthquake risk leads to the classification of municipalities into seismic
zones. In 2004, the Italian Institute for Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV), a unit of
the Civil Protection with the task to increase the knowledge on the Earth system and its
phenomena and to monitor seismic and volcanic events, analyzed the probability to face
large earthquakes based on the movement speed of the ground and defined, accordingly, 4
seismic zones. A more detailed classification with sub-categories was realized in 2015. This
classification is of interest for the central government because it allows to address policies
to the most exposed areas. One of these policies defines building standards that must be
fulfilled in high-risk seismic zones. Moreover, the central government allocates funds for
infrastructure maintenance to prevent disaster damages based on the classification.
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2.2 Administrative organization and response to natural disasters
Italy is a decentralized country where the public administration consists of 4 levels:
the central government, the region, the province, and the municipality. The main task of
regions is the provision of services in the health care sector. Provinces are responsible for
the maintenance of non-urban roads, environmental protection and secondary education.
Municipal governments are required to offer a number of services, among which the most
relevant are local transports, urban road maintenance, waste disposal, housing, social
protection, and primary education.
Since the early ’90s, the administrative organization has changed. The Law 142/1990
started a decentralization process of powers from the central government towards local
authorities with the attempt to increase the autonomy of local governments. This implied
a change in the composition of funding sources. Since 1992, an increasing share of local
government revenues derived from the withholding of tax revenues, mainly from property
taxes and surcharges on income taxes, and from the revenues generated by local service
provision. However, decisions on local tax rates are constrained by national regulation
that limits the extent to which local governments can leverage on taxation. The central
government reallocate resources among local governments with the purpose to grant equal
access to essential services across the country. In 2002, a fund for equalization was es-
tablished. The resources are distributed to local governments, both directly and through
regional governments, so that governments with insufficient own resources are able to pro-
vide the necessary services to the population.4 To grant equal access to basic services
across the country, the central government funds up to 70% of the expenditure reported
in the balance sheet of the year before.5 The other services need to be funded with own
resources.
In 2015, local governments spent 83 billion Euro, which is 10% of total public expen-
diture in Italy. Transfers of financial resources from the central and regional governments
and from other public institutions account for 14% of current revenues. These transfers are
mainly unconditional. Current transfers represent on average 70% of total transfers and
4The benchmark adopted by the central government is the average revenue of municipalities of a
given demographic class. Decree Law 267/2000 (Testo unico delle leggi sull’ordinamento degli enti locali)
classified municipalities into 12 demographic classes based on the size of the resident population and defined
regulation accordingly, because population size determines differences in needs.
5Since 2009, services provided by local governments are divided into basic services and other services.
Basic services are general administration, local police, education, local transport, social protection and
local services. Local services are housing, Civil Protection, waste disposal, water services, and services for
environmental protection.
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they are generally non-earmarked transfers, while the remaining share represents capital
transfers, which are generally distributed for specific projects, such as the construction
of infrastructures. The remaining 86% of local government revenues is composed of own
resources. Almost half of own resources are produced by local taxation (ISTAT, 2017).
The response of public authorities to natural disasters consists of two phases. Imme-
diate aid is provided to meet short-run needs, such as the provision of food and medicals,
the preparation of emergency camps, and the inspection and evaluation of damages to
infrastructures. Later on, effort is put in the recovery from losses and in the prevention
of future disasters. Generally, funds for recovery from damages are matching grants, i.e.,
they meet spending requirements for specific projects proposed by local public authorities.
Although central authorities are not obliged to intervene in the case of natural dis-
asters, usually they offer immediate support through the Civil Protection Department.6
Moreover, the law empowers the central government to claim the state of emergency and
define its duration and the involved area (Art. 5 of Law 225/1992). This claim has two
main implications. First, the central government can recur to decrees to face the situa-
tion notwithstanding the current regulation. In this way, public authorities can intervene
immediately without the need to recur to legislative procedures, which could impede a
prompt and proper response to the catastrophe. The second implication is that the state
of emergency allows to transfer financial resources from the fund of the Civil Protection to
the affected areas. However, this procedure can have a drawback in terms of timing. The
central government can claim the state of emergency only upon request from regional gov-
ernments through the Civil Protection. Commonly, regional governments decide whether
to ask for the state of emergency based on the size of damages. They delegate the collec-
tion of information from the citizens to local governments, a procedure that could delay
effective intervention.7
For medium and long-run support to disaster areas, the central government needs to
follow ordinary legislative procedures. Based on the size of damages resulting from inspec-
tions, financial resources for the reconstruction of capital and the recovery of economic
6The Civil Protection Department, which is administered by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers,
guides the prevention, response, forecast and risk monitoring activities related to both natural and man-
made disasters through central and local units across the country.
7In 2002 and 2003, further regulation was introduced in order to reduce the time of response and the
exposure to seismic risk. In case of extreme events that threaten lives of individuals, the government can
assign special powers to a delegate even before claiming the state of emergency (Art. 3 of Law 245/2002).
Also, an additional fund, managed directly by the premiership, was established to transfer resources to
regional and local governments for both prevention and disaster relief (Art. 32-bis of Decree Law 269/2003).
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activities are allocated by means of decree laws. A final tool at government disposal is the
yearly financial law, which allows to allocate additional resources to the areas affected by
catastrophic events.
3 Data and descriptive evidence
3.1 Data
In this study we use 3 main data sets: (1) local government balance sheet data, (2)
data on earthquake occurrence, and (3) data on municipality characteristics. Data on
local government expenditure are available for 7997 Italian municipalities observed for
16 years (2000-2015).8 The panel data set is obtained from the Italian Ministry of the
Interior and contains detailed information on expenditure as well as revenues of local
governments for each year.9 Our measure of expenditure (revenues) is the sum of current
and capital expenditures (revenues) registered in the competence and residual accounts in
each year.10,11
We gathered data on earthquakes from two databases available from INGV that collects
information on earthquake occurrence between 1000 and 2014.12 The first database is the
parametric catalog of earthquakes CPTI15 (Rovida et al., 2016) that includes detailed
information on each earthquake (e.g., magnitude, maximum intensity, coordinates of the
epicenter). The second database is the macro-seismic database DBMI15 (Locati et al.,
2016), which reports local earthquake intensity measures. The selection criteria for the
inclusion of an earthquake in the databases are either a maximum intensity equal to or
greater than 5 on the Mercalli scale, or a moment magnitude equal to or greater than 4.13
Although data on earthquakes for 2015 are not available, their impact is likely negligible
8A small number of municipalities merged over this period. Therefore, to construct a homogeneous
panel over the entire period, we aggregate the data of merged municipalities in the years before the
merger. We replicate the 2016 municipality structure because some data are available only for that level
of aggregation.
9Actually, we have data for the period 1990-2015 but differences in the statistics before 1998 and the
lack of data on household income in 1998 and 1999 advise not to use those data before 2000.
10The competence account registers expenditures and revenues related to cash flows, while the residual
account registers transactions for which the cash flow has not occurred yet.
11For the years 2000 and 2001 currency values expressed in Italian Lira were converted to Euro using
the fixed exchange rate of 1,936.27.
12https:// emidius.mi.ingv.it/ CPTI15-DBMI15/ .
13The intensity is measured on the Mercalli scale and quantifies the observed effects of an earthquake
on a scale from 1 to 12. The moment magnitude is a logarithmic scale that measures the energy released
by an earthquake. A unit increase in the scale corresponds to 101.5 times higher released energy. While
the magnitude is measurable with instruments, the intensity is an evaluation performed by experts based
on the observable effects on humans, infrastructures and objects.
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since INGV stated that fewer earthquakes occurred than in 2014 and only 18 shocks had
a magnitude equal to or above 4, no one bigger than 5.
The third data set includes socioeconomic, sociodemographic, and environmental char-
acteristics of Italian municipalities between 2000 and 2015. In particular, the data set
contains data on income levels, sourced from the Department of Finance of the Ministry
of Economics and Finance, data on population size, age structure and environmental char-
acteristics sourced from the Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), and political charac-
teristics sourced from the Italian Ministry of Interior. Moreover, we use data on minimum
and maximum housing prices (per square meter) provided by the Real Estate Market Ob-
servatory of the Italian Revenue Agency. These data are collected twice a year and are
complete since the second semester of 2003.
The total number of observations (municipality×year) is 127,952. Balance sheet data
and political variables are not complete for 8,076 observations. Therefore, our final data
set is an unbalanced panel composed of 119,876 observations.
3.2 Measurement of earthquake occurrence
Two measures of earthquake occurrence can be used to identify municipalities affected
by earthquakes (treated municipalities): the magnitude and the intensity. The magnitude
is an objective measure of the strength of an earthquake and its ability to serve as a proxy
for damages to human and physical capital may be questioned. Since the magnitude is a
space-invariant measure, some assumptions on the propagation of the effect in terms of
distance and direction are required to assign earthquake events to municipalities. Gen-
erally, the propagation of earthquake waves depends on the depth of the epicenter and
on the characteristics of the soil. Instead, intensity is the result of the evaluation of the
observable impact performed by experts, who usually inspect disaster areas immediately
after the shock. One cannot exclude that this evaluation is to some extent affected by sub-
jective judgment driven by emotional involvement (e.g., attachment to the disaster area
or to people who live there) or even corruption (e.g., the overestimation of the impact
of an earthquake could allow to attract more financial resources from upper-level govern-
ment). However, intensity is assessed for each municipality affected by an earthquake and
allows easily to identify towns affected by damages due to the shock. In our analysis, we
prefer the intensity-based measure of earthquake occurrence because this is a qualitative
measure of the local impact of an earthquake and varies among municipalities. The use
8
of fixed effects in our econometric models should address any claim of systematic bias in
the measurement of earthquake occurrence due to subjective judgment correlated with
the geographical/institutional setting. More than that, we perform robustness checks of
our results based on the described magnitude-based measure of earthquake occurrence
under different assumptions of propagation. We provide a more detailed description of
this approach later on in Section 5.1.1.
We assign treatment if a municipality is struck by at least one earthquake with intensity
>5 in a given year. We choose this threshold because 5 is the lowest intensity level at
which damages usually occur, and because it is the minimum intensity level for which we
have complete data. Then, we define a set of treatment dummies EQi,t−j = 1, where i
denotes the municipality and t the year, if the local maximum intensity of earthquakes
occurred in the year t − j (with j >0) is >5. This set of variables allows to capture
the impact of an earthquake at different points in time before the current year t. Our
treatment variables show that 2658 municipalities are struck by an earthquake at least
once over the period 1985-2015, and 1129 out of these municipalities are affected at least
once over the period 2000-2015.
3.3 Descriptive evidence
As preliminary suggestive evidence we compare the per capita local government expen-
diture of municipalities struck by at least one earthquake over the period 1985-2015 with
the expenditure of municipalities that did not face any earthquake during the same pe-
riod. Figure 2 shows that, on average, municipalities affected by earthquakes spend more
than other municipalities, with a mean difference for the period 2000-2015 of 106 Euro
per individual at 2010 prices. In 2015, local governments increased expenditure by 10%
on average because the central government loosed the constraints on capital expenditures,
which were limited as a consequence of the economic crises in order to attempt to reduce
public debt. Clearly, we cannot exclude that this difference is due to factors other than
earthquake occurrence, such as institutional differences or historical spending behavior.
Indeed, local government expenditure varies both across and within Italian regions, which
may be due to factors such as geographical and institutional characteristics and economic
development (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
To identify the impact of earthquakes on local government expenditure, it would be de-
sirable to observe the same municipality under the two scenarios of treatment (earthquake
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occurrence) and no treatment. Clearly, this is not possible but may not represent a prob-
lem if earthquakes are randomly assigned to municipalities. The assumption of random
assignment is challenged by earthquake occurrence over time since some areas are more
exposed than others. However, a matching procedure that enhances the comparability of
municipalities may grant sufficient strength to the analysis. Therefore, we sharpen the
evidence of Figure 2 and reduce the unobserved variability, by comparing municipalities
that are similar in the period before the occurrence of an earthquake. To do this we
construct a counterfactual group of municipalities that allow us to analyze post-treatment
variations of spending levels and to claim a causal relationship with earthquakes. Figure
3 illustrates the average spending trend of 517 treated municipalities, before and after
the occurrence of a shock, with 517 matched municipalities. We identify matched mu-
nicipalities with coarsened exact matching on average financial, sociodemographic and
socioeconomic pre-treatment characteristics (see the Appendix Section A.1 for further in-
formation on the matching procedure and Table A.1 for the balancing properties). Note
that, before treatment occurs, average per capita local government expenditure is almost
identical in the two groups. Starting from the first year after the treatment period (period
0), expenditure sharply diverges. Treated municipalities seem to spend much more than
the counterfactual group. Spending trends start to converge again from the 7th year after
the disaster, though not completely.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics on the characteristics of 1129 municipalities
struck by an earthquake over the period 2000-2015 and 5339 unaffected municipalities.
We observe that in the year before the occurrence of an earthquake, municipalities do
not significantly differ in terms of per capita expenditure and revenues, while the revenue
composition tends to differ in treated municipalities. Treated municipalities collect less
local taxes than the control group, which could be due to the lower household income and
the higher share of low-income population.14 The lower amount of local tax revenues is
partially offset by increased transfers of financial resources from the central and regional
governments. The aggregate revenues from local taxation and transfers account for about
60% of total revenues.
After an earthquake, both local government expenditure and revenues significantly
14We define the share of low-income population as the share of individuals earning a yearly income less
than or equal to 10,000 Euro. Note that our income data is structured in 8 income classes and for each
class we have information on the total amount of income and the number of individuals. According to our
definition, the low-income individuals are those of the two lowest income classes representing about 39%
of the total number of individuals.
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increase by 198 and 185 Euro per capita, respectively. The immediate increase of revenues
allows to limit losses. Additional revenues are composed for more than 60% of transfers
from the central and regional governments. Revenues from local taxation, instead, do
not vary significantly on average. As for the population size and age structure, treated
municipalities are almost twice as populated as other municipalities and, before the shock,
they have a slightly higher fraction of the youngest and oldest age cohorts. Population
size does not significantly vary after the shock, but the age structure changes since the
percentage of young people tend to shrink, while the elderly share increases. This could
suggest that elderly people are less mobile because of physical limitations, or stronger
emotional attachment to their town.
This preliminary evidence suggests that the comparison of expenditure levels between
municipalities affected and not affected by earthquakes should carefully address differences
in terms of characteristics that could confound expenditure variations. The following em-
pirical strategy controls for those observable characteristics as well as other unobservable
time-invariant characteristics.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Earthquakes and spending levels
To assess the impact of earthquakes on local government expenditure, we regress per
capita expenditure against earthquake measures and control for characteristics of munici-
palities and local institutions that may affect spending levels as well as for time-invariant
heterogeneity.15 We specify the following model:
yit = T
′
itα+ x
′
itβ + θt + γi + εit (1)
where yit is the natural logarithm of per capita expenditure of municipality i in year
t. T ′it is a vector of treatment variables, i.e., earthquake indicators, and x
′
it is a vector
of time-varying controls, including the intercept term. Controls (x′it) include income,
population age structure, geographic and political characteristics, and funding sources
from the central and regional governments. α and β are the vectors of parameters to be
estimated. θt are time fixed effects, γi is a municipality-specific time-invariant element,
15The literature has suggested several features of local governments that are likely to affect the expen-
diture. See for instance Gennari and Messina (2014) and Lundqvist (2015).
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and εit is the idiosyncratic error term.
In our baseline specification T ′itα is defined as:
T ′itα =
1∑
j=0
αjEQi,t−j + EQi,t−d × (αd1Distit + αd2Dist2it + αd3Dist3it) (2)
where EQi,t−j and EQi,t−d are the dummy treatment variables described in Section 3.2.
More precisely, the two terms in the summation, EQit and EQi,t−1, capture the effect
of an earthquake occurred in the current year and one year before, respectively. The
shocks occurred earlier (more than one year before) are captured by EQi,t−d, where d
is the temporal distance from the most recent earthquake before t − 1 (1 < d 6 15).
We define Distit = d if EQi,t−d is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the distance
polynomial of third degree (within brackets) is a non-linear time-trend capturing medium-
run marginal effects of earthquakes on expenditure. We consider a non-linear time-trend
to capture a possible inverse U -shaped effect and a tail of earthquakes on expenditure.16
Indeed, our descriptive statistics suggest that expenditure initially grows and then tends
to converge to pre-treatment levels. We impose Distit 6 15 since beyond this period we
generally observe a convergence of expenditure to pre-treatment levels, as suggested by
the descriptive statistics in Section 3.3.17
The covariates that compose the vector x′it are a set of time-varying financial, political,
socioeconomic, and sociodemographic variables, and a set of time-invariant environmental
characteristics. Financial variables include the natural logarithm of per capita transfers
from the central and regional governments, and the natural logarithm of per capita rev-
enues from local taxation. Political variables include the vote-share concentration of the
local government Council, the number of years before municipal elections, a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the incumbent government is center-right oriented, and a dummy
variable equal to one if the incumbent mayor reached his term limit. Socioeconomic vari-
ables include the natural logarithm of average yearly per capita income and the share of
low-income population, and sociodemographic variables include the share of the youngest
(0-14 years) and oldest (>65 years) age cohorts. Environmental characteristics are cap-
16We use a third-order polynomial time-trend because, according to preliminary findings, it is the most
suitable specification to capture the effect of an earthquake on local government expenditure. Indeed, in
what follows we use also a model specification including yearly lags of earthquake occurrence measures
(see Section 5.2).
17Preliminary findings suggest that spending levels tend to converge to pre-disaster levels between the
10th and the 15th year after an earthquake. Moreover, the impact of an earthquake is fully observed for a
maximum of 15 periods in our panel.
12
tured by dummy variables equal to 1 indicating whether a municipality is a partially
mountainous jurisdiction, a mountainous jurisdiction, or a coastal jurisdiction.
To estimate the parameters of our model we use three methods: pooled OLS, ran-
dom effects, and fixed effects regressions. Pooled OLS provides consistent parameters but
treats observations as mutually independent and does not account for serial dependence
of observations. Hence, the main limitation of the pooled OLS model is that possible
unobserved heterogeneity among municipalities is neglected (γi = 0). However, both OLS
and random effects regressions include a region-specific time-invariant effect.18 The ran-
dom effects model treats unobserved heterogeneity of municipalities as a random shock
and requires the assumption that γi is iid. The fixed effects model relaxes this assumption
by allowing γi to be correlated with the other exogenous variables, but it does not allow
to include environmental time-invariant characteristics and region fixed effects.19 The
random effects model is more efficient, but if the assumption on the independence of the
time-invariant error is violated, the estimates are biased. In that case, the fixed effects
model should be preferred because it estimates consistent parameters. Since several unob-
served factors could lead to differences in spending levels (e.g., geographic characteristic,
touristic attractiveness, economic development), we expect the fixed effects model to be
more appropriate. We formally test this assumption using the Hausman test.
In addition, we specify a first-order autoregressive model and include the lag of the
dependent variable as a regressor in Equation 1. This specification allows to capture
the persistence of local government expenditure that may be driven by historic and in-
stitutional factors. We estimate this model with municipality fixed effects. Since serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity may affect the estimation of the standard errors, we use
robust standard errors clustered by municipality in all specifications.
An issue that needs to be discussed is the possible endogeneity of upper-level gov-
ernment transfers. In Equation 1, we assume that transfers are exogenous, and hence
transfers lead to a variation of local government expenditure because more resources are
available, as literature in this field suggests (e.g. Gennari and Messina, 2014; Revelli, 2006).
However, variations of transfers from upper-level governments may not be completely ex-
18Note that region-specific time-invariant effects account for heterogeneity between ordinary and au-
tonomous regions with special statute (i.e. the regions Valle D’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicily and
Sardinia, and the provinces of Bolzano and Trento), such as differences in the funding mechanism of public
expenditure. Moreover, conditional on region-specific time-invariant effects, our regression results are not
sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of autonomous regions with special statute.
19Two municipalities of the region Marche became part of Emilia-Romagna in 2010. However, this
change is not significant.
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ogenous to expenditure variations if they are influenced by higher spending requirements
(Lundqvist, 2015) or by the ability of politicians to attract financial resources from upper-
level governments (Galletta, 2017). In this case, OLS and GLS estimates could be biased
because the assumption on the independence of the error term (E[εit|X] = 0) is violated.
The within-estimator of the fixed effects model partially accommodates this problem since
it accounts for time-invariant factors that lead to the endogeneity of transfers. We further
address this issue by a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach discussed in Section
5.1.
We test the robustness of our identification strategy by defining other criteria for the
assignment of treatment. We use different earthquake-intensity thresholds and magnitude-
based measures to define treated municipalities. Note, however, that raising the intensity
threshold implies a reduction in the number of treated municipalities. Over the period
2000-2015, municipalities struck by an earthquake with intensity > 6 are 213, and only
46 with intensity > 7. Such a low number of treated municipalities could have some
drawbacks in the econometric estimation. If we raise the intensity cut-off and sharpen our
sample of affected municipalities we expect to observe a larger impact of earthquakes on
expenditure. Finally, to confirm our evidence, we repeat the analysis using the sharper
sample of matched municipalities defined in Section 3.3, which is likely less exposed to
unobserved heterogeneity but also more prone to dim the effect due to proximity between
treated and matched municipalities.
4.2 Asymmetric and heterogeneous responses to grants
Descriptive evidence in Section 3.3 suggests that central and regional governments
largely contribute to local disaster relief through the transfer of financial resources to
municipalities. To better understand how earthquakes, local government expenditure and
transfers are related to each other, we run a preliminary analysis using two models, where
the dependent variable is either local government expenditure (as in the previous Equation
1) or transfers. To see the impact of earthquakes in different years, we use a linear vector
of all earthquake occurrence dummies in the last 12 years, T ′α =
∑11
j=0 αjEQt−j , instead
of the polynomial specification of Equation 2. Therefore, we estimate the yearly ATT of
an earthquake on both expenditure and transfers. We limit the analysis to the 11th year
after the disaster since previous results suggest that after that period the effect of one
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single earthquake is negligible.20
One interesting aspect on the effect of grants is the comparison between earthquake-
related grants (mostly matching grants) and other types of grants (mostly unconditional
grants). The literature on flypaper effects generally suggests that matching grants have
greater influence on expenditure than unconditional grants, since the former combine an
income and a substitution effect (Gramlich, 1977).21 To provide empirical evidence on
the flypaper effect in Italy, Gennari and Messina (2014) focus on unconditional grants
and, therefore, try to exclude outlier observations due to shocks to avoid any confounding
factor related to matching grants. We can contrast this approach by exploiting the large
and unique dataset of earthquake occurrences to separate (earthquake-specific) matching
grants from unconditional grants. This allows us to disentangle heterogeneous flypaper
effects and asymmetric responses to different types of grants. Since data on earthquake-
specific grants are limited and incomplete, we use the control group of not treated munic-
ipalities identified by the matching procedure above to predict the average growth rate of
(unconditional) transfers if earthquakes would not have occurred.22,23
We can now use predicted grants of different types to expand the linear flypaper effect
model (Gennari and Messina, 2014) as follows:
Yit = α1MGit + α2MAit + α3UGit + α4UAit +X
′
itβ + θt + γi + εit (3)
where Yit is the level of per capita expenditure of municipality i in year t, MGit is the level
of (earthquake-specific) matching grants and UGit is the level of unconditional grants. X
′
it
is the vector of control variables as in Section 4. θt and γi are time and municipality fixed
effects, and εit is an iid error term.
The variables MAit and UAit measure the decrease of matching and unconditional
grants relative to the previous year (t − 1), respectively, and are specified as MAit =
MDit(MGit −MGi,t−1) and UAit = UDit(UGit − UGi,t−1) ,with MDit and UDit being
dummy variables equal to one if the respective grants are decreasing, and 0 otherwise.
20We also perform the analysis with j = 15, but coefficients for j > 11 are not significant.
21This is because public goods relative prices tend to fall, which shifts resources away from private
goods.
22Balance sheet data does not allow to identify transfers received for disaster relief. The Department of
the Civil Protection provides reports on the allocation of earthquake relief funds, but these documents cover
only the period 2012-2015 and detailed information on the resources received by each local government is
not always available.
23Barone and Mocetti (2014) compare the effects of two large earthquakes in Italy by means of a
synthetic control approach based on regional data.
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Therefore, MAit and UAit capture the asymmetric response of expenditure to variations
in the two types of grants. In accordance with Gennari and Messina (2014), not significant
estimates of the parameters α2 and α4 imply that local governments react similarly to
increases and decreases in transfers. Conversely, significant estimates of α2 and α4 imply
that α1+α2 measures the expenditure response to decreasing matching grants, and α3+α4
is the response to decreasing unconditional grants. Negative and significant parameters
α2 and α4 suggest that local government expenditure is more sensitive to increases than
to decreases in transfers, while positive and significant estimates suggest the opposite.
In the literature on flypaper effect, the former type of response is known as the ”fiscal
replacement” effect (Gramlich, 1987), while the latter type of response is the so-called
”fiscal restraint” effect (Gamkhar and Oates, 1996).
The final part of our empirical strategy hypothesizes that the response of local gov-
ernments to earthquake shocks differs across the country, between Northern and Southern
municipalities. To this aim, we modify the above Equation 3 to include the interaction
terms between grants (both unconditional and earthquake-specific grants) and a dummy
variable equal to one if a municipality is located in Southern regions, namely Abruzzo,
Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily.24 The two asymmetry variables
are now dropped.25 For simplicity, we will use North and Northern to refer to all other
regions. A further distinction between North and Center has been considered but did not
provide significant differences.
5 Results
5.1 The impact on spending levels
The effect of earthquake shocks on local government spending from the estimation
of Equation 1 using pooled OLS, random effects, fixed effects, and autoregressive fixed-
effects regressions is summarized in Table 2.26 Since the dependent variable, i.e., the
per capita local government expenditure, is log-transformed, coefficients multiplied by
100 can be interpreted as percentage changes of expenditure after the occurrence of an
24This classification is provided by ISTAT, except for Sicily which is classified as Island together with
Sardinia. However, Sicily is commonly identified as a Southern region because of its geographical location
and cultural and environmental aspects.
25Note that the two asymmetry variables are not significantly different between municipalities in the
North and in the South (results not reported here).
26Note that the lag of the dependent variable in the autoregressive model is grouped with the financial
time-variant controls.
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earthquake. The coefficients of earthquake occurrence in the current and the previous year
(EQt and EQt−1) can be interpreted as average treatment effects on treated municipalities
(ATT). The coefficients of all treatment variables are highly significant, slightly less for
the immediate effect EQt. The OLS results are basically in line with panel data models
although repeated observations over time and possible correlation between the treatment
variables and unobserved characteristics of municipalities are not taken into account. Only
the coefficient of the immediate effect, EQt, is likely overestimated.
The estimates from the random and fixed effects models are very similar. However,
we can easily reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, which suggests that the
fixed effects model should be preferred.27 The fixed effects specification controls for time-
invariant municipality-specific characteristics such as geographical seismic zones.28 All the
coefficients are slightly lower in the autoregressive specification (column 4), which suggests
that earthquake measures partially capture the effect of persistent spending.
In the fixed effects specifications, the immediate impact of an earthquake on local
government expenditure is between 1.90% and 1.94%, which roughly corresponds to 27-
28 Euro per capita. After one year, the effect of the shock is three times larger with a
shift of local government expenditure between 6.03% and 6.60% (98-108 Euro per capita).
This is an expected result for a developped country according to Noy and Nualsri (2011).
Since local governments may not respond immediately to the shock and the budget needs
some time to be adjusted, we observe that the impact is higher one year after the event.
The local government may rather decide to respond immediately by changing the spend-
ing composition and reallocate the resources destined to services that cannot be offered
anymore due to unavailable infrastructures or loss of human capital. Other spending cat-
egories (e.g. local services, social protection) may now require more resources to tackle
the consequences of the seismic event. After one year the expenditure tends to increase
because of investments in disaster relief, e.g. cleaning, reconstruction and reimbursement
of damages to citizens. Moreover, the delay in the increase of expenditure may be due to
the timing of external aid from upper-level governments and from charity.
Differences in spending levels between treated and unaffected municipalities are not
limited to the short-run. The first-, second- and third-order interaction terms between
27The Hausman test returns the statistic χ2(29) = 10, 709.28, and the critical value in a 99.9% confidence
interval is χ20.001(29) = 58.30.
28Note, however, that the inclusion of seismic zones into OLS and random effects models does not affect
the results.
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earthquake occurrence and time passed since the latest shock suggest that the effect on
spending levels tends to increase in the years after the event, but then expenditure slowly
converges to pre-disaster levels (negative coefficient of second-order interaction and posi-
tive coefficient of the third-order interaction). The estimates show that expenditure con-
tinues to grow until 4-5 years after the disaster and then regresses to pre-disaster levels
after 11-12 years.29
To correct the estimates for possible endogeneity of transfers from central and regional
governments, we use an IV approach and estimate the model in column 3 using 2SLS
and the second lag of transfers received by neighboring jurisdictions as an exogenous
instrument.30 The estimates for the parameters are reported in column 5. Diagnostic tests
confirm that transfers are endogenous and that the IV specification provides consistent
estimates compared to the fixed effects specification. The coefficients of all earthquake-
occurrence variables are lower in absolute values and EQt loses significance. This is most
likely determined by the fact that transfers from central and regional governments increase
when an earthquake occurs and, given that the first-stage regression of the IV approach
accounts also for earthquake variables, exogenous transfers in the second stage regression
capture part of the effect of an earthquake on expenditure. Nevertheless, the coefficients
still show that the effect of an earthquake on expenditure lasts for 11-12 years.
5.1.1 Robustness checks
The robustness of our main results is ensured by an alternative approach to identify
the effect of earthquakes on local government expenditure based on the matching sam-
ple described in Section 3.3 (see also the Appendix Section A.1 for information on the
matching procedure). Moreover, we consider several different criteria for the assignment
of treatment. When we run regressions using the sample of matched municipalities (see
Table A.2 in the Appendix) we obtain similar results, but the coefficients of the treat-
ment variables are slightly larger. This is because the prevalence of municipalities struck
by stronger earthquakes is greater in the matching sample than in the full population of
29We compute the growing period by looking at the maximum of the estimated function defined by the
two interaction terms (d = (−2αˆd2−
√
4αˆ2d2 − 12αˆd1αˆd3)/6αˆd3, with αˆd1, αˆd2 and αˆd3 being the estimates
of the parameters αd1, αd2 and αd3 in Equation 2, respectively) and calculate the convergence period by
computing the zeros of the same function (d = (−αˆd2 −
√
αˆ2d2 − 4αˆd1αˆd3)/2αˆd3).
30Differences are negligible indeed if we repeat the estimation using the first or the second temporal lag
of transfers instead of the spatial-temporal lag.
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Italian municipalities.31 Exception is the pooled OLS model (column 1) which provides
a significant estimate only for the coefficient of EQt−1, but the limitations of this model
have been described in Section 4.1.
We run a second robustness check using higher minimum intensity levels (6 and 7
instead of 5) to assign treatment (see Table A.3, columns 1 and 2, in the Appendix). The
results are in line with our baseline results, although the effects are much larger due to the
focus on stronger earthquakes. Also, spending levels reach pre-treatment levels 15 years
after the shock, three years later than previous estimates suggest.
Finally, we define earthquake occurrence measures based on the magnitude of the earth-
quake. We select earthquakes with moment magnitude >4 because this is the minimum
magnitude for which the INGV includes earthquakes in the database. The magnitude
is generally more objective than the intensity, but we need to assume that the energy
released by an earthquake propagates homogeneously from the epicenter in all directions
since it is measured at the epicenter only.32 Therefore, we considered municipalities within
some distance from the closest epicenter. In particular, we use 10 km, 20 km, and 30 km
distance thresholds between the epicenter and the centroid of each municipality. As shown
in Table A.3, columns 3-5, in the Appendix, our baseline results are confirmed. The es-
timates show that the greater the distance from the epicenter, the lower is the impact on
local government expenditure (moving from column 3 to column 5). In particular, the
model using the 20-km range for the assignment of treatment (column 4) provides simi-
lar estimates to those obtained in Table 2. This implies that municipalities struck with
intensity >5 are located, on average, within 20 km from an epicenter with magnitude > 4.
5.2 The role of grants
The role played by grants from upper-level governments in raising expenditure follow-
ing an earthquake is summarized by the results reported in Table 3. Column 1 shows
fixed effects estimates on the natural logarithm of per capita local government expendi-
ture, and column 2 on the natural logarithm of per capita transfers. The coefficients of
treatment variables are significant until the 10th year after the disaster for local govern-
ment expenditure, similarly to the results obtained in Table 2, and until the 9th year for
31In the total population of municipalities, 19% of the treated municipalities are struck by an earthquake
with intensity equal to 6, and 4% with intensity > 7. In the matching sample, these percentages increase
to 20% and 5%, respectively.
32In 2017, an earthquake struck the isle of Ischia in the Campania region with a relatively low magnitude
of 4, but caused relevant damages.
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transfers. Moreover, transfers of financial resources grow initially faster than local govern-
ment expenditure after an earthquake, and absolute per capita variations (in Euro) show
that transfers increase more than expenditure between the 2nd and the 7th year after an
event (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 3).33 This evidence is illustrated in Figure 4 with
95% confidence intervals. While the increase in per capita expenditure is roughly stable
between the 2nd and the 6th year after an earthquake, transfers from central and regional
governments follow a different trend. Central and regional governments tend to respond
immediately to the higher spending requirements of treated municipalities. Then, from
the 8th year after the event, additional transfers fall below the increase in expenditure.
Overall, the increase in transfers overcomes the increase in expenditure.
Over the overall period (11 years), treated municipalities spend 952 Euro per individ-
ual more than not affected municipalities, while per capita transfers are 1201 Euro higher.
Hence, transfers of financial resources from central and regional governments seem to ex-
ceed expenditure by 249 Euro per individual. If we consider that the average population
of a treated municipality between 2000 and 2015 is about 10,000 individuals and 1129 mu-
nicipalities are struck by an earthquake, the difference between transfers and expenditure
amounts to almost 2.8 billion Euro. Generally, policy makers at central and regional levels
allocate grants to municipalities affected by earthquakes mainly in the form of matching
transfers. Although local governments are supposed to make use of these resources over
time, some amount remains on hold and does not translate into higher expenditure for
several years. Actually, an effective monitoring system on how resources are spent is still
not in place, and transfers may also partially compensate lower revenues from local taxa-
tion, since the central government can allow to postpone the payment of taxes for people
residing in disaster areas.
5.3 Flypaper effect and asymmetric response
The effects of earthquake-related grants (matching grants) and unconditional grants
on local government spending are compared in Table 4. This table reports the results
from fixed effects regressions using Equation 3. In column 1 the two asymmetry variables
are initially excluded from the estimation. Note that both earthquake-specific and un-
conditional grants stimulate expenditure more than income. The expenditure response
33We transform the estimates of the treatment variables in columns 1 and 2 into real per capita variations
using ˆATT t−j = (1 − e−αˆj )y¯t−j , with y identifying either per capita expenditure or per capita transfers
at 2010 prices, y¯t−j = E[yit|EQi,t−j = 1], and αˆj being the estimated coefficients of EQt−j .
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to one additional Euro of unmatching grants is almost 13 times larger than the response
to income.34 Our estimated coefficient is slightly different from the coefficient estimated
by Gennari and Messina (2014). This is because we use a fixed effects specification and
data for a different period, and aggregate central and regional government transfers and
current and capital transfers. However, our results are similar to the results obtained by
Gamkhar and Oates (1996). Although the impact of matching grants is more than 5 times
the effect of income, the multiplier is smaller than the multiplier of unconditional grants
(about half). This is apparently surprising since the theory suggests that specific transfers
should have at least the same effect on expenditure as unconditional transfers (Bailey and
Connolly, 1998). However, as we will see later in Section 5.4, this is an average effect
that does not account for heterogeneity in the response across the country, likely due to
remarkable variation of efficiency in the use of earthquake-specific transfers.
In column 2, we extend the model to include the two asymmetry variables that capture
different effects between increasing and decreasing transfers. The negative and significant
coefficient of the asymmetry variable relative to unconditional grants suggests that there
is a replacement effect when transfers decrease, i.e., expenditure is sticky to decreasing
unconditional grants, a result in line with the findings of Gennari and Messina (2014). Sim-
ilarly, expenditure is less responsive to decreasing than to increasing earthquake-specific
grants, although this asymmetric response is more pronounced than the response to un-
conditional transfers. The sum of the estimated parameters of earthquake-specific grants
(αˆ1) and their asymmetry variable (αˆ2) is close to zero and suggests that a reduction in
the transfers for earthquake recovery has negligible effects on spending levels.
In column 3, we report the results from the estimation of a 2SLS fixed effects regression
instrumenting general transfers and the relative asymmetry variable with the second lag
of general transfers and the second lag of general transfers of neighboring municipalities
(2-years spatial lag).35 Diagnostic tests confirm that general transfers are endogenous and
that the instrumental variable approach yields consistent estimates. We can see that the
effect of general grants on spending levels is more remarkable than in column 1 and 2, and
the coefficient of the asymmetric response to decreasing grants loses significance. These
coefficients are very close to the estimates of Gennari and Messina (2014). Conversely, the
34The coefficient of unmatching grants does not change if we estimate Equation 3 using only the sub-
sample of municipalities not affected by earthquakes.
35To enhance the comparability of our results with those obtained by Gennari and Messina (2014),
we repeat the estimation using the first and the second temporal lag of transfers, but differences are
insignificant.
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estimated parameters of earthquake-specific grants and their asymmetry variable are very
close to the coefficients reported in column 2. Overall, these results allow to conclude that
there is evidence of flypaper effect for both types of grants. However, we find inconclusive
evidence of an asymmetric response to increasing vs. decreasing unconditional transfers
(fiscal replacement), similarly to most previous studies but differently, for instance, from
Levaggi and Zanola (2003), who testify a fiscal restraint type of asymmetry on regional
health care expenditure in Italy. Conversely, the fiscal replacement effect is remarkable for
earthquake-specific matching grants, suggesting that public officials may exploit the oc-
currence of earthquakes to maintain higher spending levels. Moreover, local governments
are apparently unable to fully exploit upper-level government transfers to increase expen-
diture when struck by an earthquake. This suggests a delay in the response to increasing
grants, leading to an inefficient use of resources for disaster relief. We further address this
aspect in the next Section 5.4.
5.4 The North-South divide
5.4.1 Timing of the response
Local governments may differ in the response to earthquake recovery measures. Sev-
eral aspects, such as culture, history and institutional quality, may affect this response.
Barone and Mocetti (2014) argue that these differences influence economic outcomes af-
ter an earthquake. They compare two big earthquakes in Italy and show that the lower
institutional quality in the South worsened after the shock and led to a lower economic
growth (for a discussion on the regional divide in Italy, see for instance Felice (2018) and
Gonza´lez (2011)). Following this evidence and inspired by the above findings on asymmet-
ric and heterogeneous flypaper effects, we analyze how the response of local governments
to earthquake shocks differs between Northern an Southern municipalities. The results
from the estimation of the extended Equation 3 to include the interaction terms between
grants and location are reported in Table 5.
As for unconditional grants, we do not observe a significantly different effect be-
tween Northern and Southern municipalities (in column 1, the coefficient of the inter-
action term between the South dummy and unconditional grants is not significant). Con-
versely, earthquake-specific grants show a significantly different effect between Northern
and Southern municipalities. In the North, one additional Euro of transfers for earthquake
recovery raises expenditure by 1.43 Euro, while in the South the effect is significantly lower
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(0.22 Euro, i.e., the sum of the coefficient of earthquake-specific grants and the interaction
term). Therefore, municipalities in the North seem to overreact to transfers for earthquake
recovery, while expenditure in the South is much more sticky. Note that Northern munici-
palities are generally less dependent on transfers and their spending levels are lower, which
may suggest a lower inertia to changes in transfers. Also, the slower use of earthquake-
related resources by municipalities in the South may be the consequence of higher levels
of corruption (Mauro, 1995).
The possible delay in the utilization of earthquake-related funds is worth of further
analysis. The model in columns 2 and 3 includes the first and second lag of earthquake-
specific grants and runs separate regressions for Northern and Southern municipalities. In
the North, the inclusion of past matching grants in the regression reduces the estimated
coefficient of current-period grants below 1, while the coefficient of the first lag is significant
and equal to 1.1, and the coefficient of the second lag is not significant. This suggests that
Northern local governments have at most one-year delay in the reaction to additional
resources from upper-level governments. Instead, in the South, the immediate response to
matching grants is lower (0.128 vs. 0.686), and both the first and the second lag of grants
are significant. Moreover, both lag coefficients are below 1 and lower than the estimated
coefficients for the North, suggesting that a larger amount of financial resources received
by local governments is not spent in the short-run. This may indicate that municipalities
in the South are affected by poorer institutional quality, which in turn may cause only
partial or delayed recovery from earthquake damages and hinder local economic growth
in the future.
5.4.2 Spending composition and growth
To further explore possible inefficiencies in local government response to earthquake
shocks, we analyze how disaster relief resources are allocated to different spending cate-
gories. In Table 6, we compare variations in the spending composition between munic-
ipalities in the North and in the South in the 5 years before and after the occurrence
of an earthquake.36,37 Before the shock, municipalities in the South spend on average
25.9% of the total budget on local services, which exceeds by 6.6% the budget allocated
36The spending category Other includes local police, justice, culture, sports and economic development
which aggregated account on average for less than 10% of the total budget.
37Table 6 in the Appendix reports variations before and after the shock and between municipalities in
the North and in the South and significance levels of t-tests on mean differences.
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by municipalities in the North. Not surprisingly, after the shock, the expenditure share of
local services grows in both macro regions since it includes expenditure on public infras-
tructures, water supply and waste disposal. More precisely, municipalities in the North
allocate 2.32% and 0.96% significantly more resources to local services and administra-
tion, respectively, while the budget share for the other spending categories significantly
decreases, except for transport services. Instead, the share allocated to local services by
Southern municipalities increases by 5.1%, which goes to the detriment of the budget
share allocated to the other spending categories (a significant decrease for transport ser-
vices and other services). Therefore, the main difference in the spending composition
between Northern and Southern municipalities lies in the remarkable increase of funds
for local services in the South, and a relatively more equal allocation of resources across
spending categories in the North. While the response of local governments to earthquake
shocks in Northern municipalities encompasses all areas of government action, Southern
municipalities put their effort mainly in the enhancement of local services.
The heterogeneous response to earthquake shocks observed between the North and
the South in terms of timing in the use of resources and their allocation points at the
most efficient recovery from earthquake shocks. Therefore, we relate the availability and
allocation of earthquake-specific resources to economic growth and compare treated and
matched unaffected municipalities in the North and in the South.38 We use personal
income and mean housing prices as proxies for local economic growth since data on gross
domestic product (GDP) are not available at municipality level.39 The trends of these
variables are illustrated in Figure 5. Note that, in the North, personal income grows
faster in struck municipalities than in unaffected municipalities in the first decade after an
earthquake (Figure 5a). Conversely, in the South, the two groups of municipalities have
identical income trends (Figure 5b). Similarly, housing prices (per square meter) in the
South do not change significantly between struck and unaffected municipalities (Figure
5d). Instead, in the North, housing prices start to grow faster after 4 years in struck
municipalities as compared to unaffected municipalities (Figure 5c). This evidence is even
more pronounced if we limit the focus to earthquakes with intensity equal or greater than
6. It appears that the result is related to different responses to earthquake shocks between
38In this part of the analysis we exclude municipalities from the region Abruzzo because the 2009
earthquake that affected this region is an outlying shock with strong damages and large financial windfall
for reconstruction from upper-tier governments.
39See, for instance, Cheung et al. (2018) and Naoi et al. (2009) for an examination of the effects of
earthquakes in terms of house and land values.
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municipalities in the two macro-regions. Transfers from central and regional governments
in the North (Figure 6a) grow after the occurrence of an earthquake, but converge to
pre-earthquake levels after 6 years. Conversely, in the South, struck municipalities remain
persistently more dependent on upper-tier government transfers for at least 10 years (see
Figure 6b) and allocate a large share of additional resources to local services (Figure 6c
and 6d).
This evidence obtained from the large dataset of all Italian municipalities and earth-
quake events between 2000 and 2015, seems to confirm the heterogeneous effects between
North and South found by Barone and Mocetti (2014) in their deep investigation of two
Italian earthquakes. Even if a larger amount of resources for recovery is allocated to dis-
aster areas in the South, these jurisdictions seem unable to exploit the financial windfall
to recover from damages and improve economic growth. Conversely, local governments in
the North appear more efficient in exploiting transfers from upper-level governments to
expand expenditure and recover from damages. This translates into new infrastructure
and the replacement of obsolete technologies destroyed or damaged by the earthquake,
which allows to foster local economic development and to accelerate growth. Likely, the
allocation of resources among spending categories in the North speeds up recovery and
fosters local economic growth. The higher increase in the expenditure share for local ser-
vices in the South could suggest that resources are not used efficiently or favor corruption.
Indeed, although local services represents the spending category mostly affected by earth-
quakes (urban road maintenance and the maintenance/construction of public buildings),
the construction industry is also well exposed to corruption scandals.
6 Concluding remarks
Local governments differ in the response to economic and social damages caused by
natural disasters (earthquakes), in terms of spending behavior and the use of grants from
upper tiers. Earthquake-related grants (matching grants) may also differ from other types
of grants (mostly unconditional) in terms of stimulatory power, and expenditure may
differ in the response to increasing and decreasing grants, leading to asymmetric and
heterogeneous reactions (different flypaper effects). We explore these differences using
municipality data and all earthquake shocks from a country largely exposed to seismic
events - Italy - between 2000 and 2015.
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We find evidence of increasing expenditure for about 11-12 years after a shock, before
regressing to pre-earthquake levels. Over the whole period, affected municipalities spend
950 Euro per individual more than not affected municipalities, and transfers from central
and regional governments exceed expenditure by about 250 Euro per individual. The
average impact of both earthquake-specific and unconditional grants on expenditure is
much larger than the response to income, suggesting the presence of a flypaper effect.
However, we find evidence of an asymmetric response to decreasing grants (i.e., a fiscal
replacement effect) only for earthquake-specific grants, suggesting that public officials tend
to maintain higher spending levels after the occurrence of an earthquake.
The impact of matching grants is remarkably heterogeneous across the country. In the
North, municipalities seem to overreact to transfers (one additional Euro raises expen-
diture by 1.43 Euro), while Southern municipalities react to the drop of grants showing
inertia in expenditure levels (0.22 Euro response). This evidence is coupled with a more
efficient recovery in Northern municipalities which allows both personal income and hous-
ing prices to grow faster than if no earthquake would have occurred, as suggested by
(Barone and Mocetti, 2014). Moreover, while the response of Northern municipalities en-
compasses all areas of government action, Southern municipalities put their effort mainly
in the enhancement of local services. Therefore, evidence from Northern municipalities
points at a possible explanation in accordance with the recent finding by Allers and Ver-
meulen (2016), showing that additional grants are capitalized into house values rather
than in rent taking by bureaucrats or politicians. Conversely, the extraction of rent from
uninformed voters by self-interested politicians (Brollo et al., 2013; Persson and Tabellini,
2000) could represent a more valid explanation for Southern regions. Here, the spending
category mostly affected by earthquake damages (local services) attracts the largest part
of additional grants, fostering exposure to corruption scandals within the construction
industry (Galletta, 2017).
To conclude, the role of upper-level governments is crucial in disaster relief but the
quality of the response of local governments affects economic outcomes. There is scope for
an improved monitoring system on how local governments employ disaster relief resources
in order to recover quickly and efficiently. Future research should investigate more in detail
factors affecting efficient recovery to identifying best-practices and provide guidance for
policy makers.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Municipality characteristics.
(1) (2) (3)
Control group Treated group
Before After
Expenditure p/c 1509.7 1332.1** 1664.1***
(1647.6) (861.9) (1517.1)
Revenues p/c 1624.7 1674.4 1833.3**
(1686.7) (1041.0) (1583.5)
Transfers p/c 550.9 623.5* 706.2*
(881.1) (706.5) (903.3)
Tax revenues p/c 420.4 340.9*** 344.1
(305.3) (196.7) (184.9)
Average income 16504.4 14966.0*** 15296.9
(3799.4) (3728.9) (3609.5)
% low-income population 38.79 47.68*** 45.44***
(13.26) (14.51) (13.65)
Population 6260.8 11714.2*** 10479.5
(26275.1) (88876.1) (79286.5)
% young (0-14 years) 13.19 13.40* 12.94***
(2.865) (3.169) (3.007)
% old (>65 years) 21.99 22.65** 23.41**
(6.150) (6.755) (6.412)
Partial mountain jurisdiction 10.11% 9.83%
Mountain jurisdiction 53.59% 54.03%
Coastal jurisdiction 10.68% 6.55%
Observations 84521 920 1165
Municipalities 5339 1129
Notes - The table presents mean characteristics of municipalities struck by earthquakes (treated group) with intensity
>5 over the period 1985-2015 and mean characteristics of unaffected municipalities (control group). Column 1
presents means for the period 2000-2015, Columns 2 and 3 present means for the year before and the year after an
earthquake occurs, respectively. If a municipality is affected by multiple earthquakes within three consecutive years,
we aggregate the events and define the before-period as the year before the first shock and the after-period as the
year after the last shock. This excludes the overlapping of observations on expenditure for the year after the first
event and the year before the following event for the same municipality. Stars in column 2 indicate significance levels
of t-tests on mean differences between column 1 and 2. Stars in column 3 indicate significance levels of t-tests on
mean differences between column 2 and 3. For the last three variables, we show sample frequencies because they are
time-invariant. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Currency values are discounted at 2010 prices.
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Table 2: Impact of earthquakes on local government expenditure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS RE FE FE (AR1) IV FE
EQt 0.0278** 0.0179* 0.0194* 0.0190** 0.0139
(0.0107) (0.00827) (0.00860) (0.00736) (0.00934)
EQt−1 0.0651*** 0.0632*** 0.0660*** 0.0603*** 0.0554***
(0.0110) (0.00945) (0.00976) (0.00808) (0.00949)
EQt−d × Dist 0.0242*** 0.0285*** 0.0305*** 0.0166*** 0.0186***
(0.00402) (0.00375) (0.00398) (0.00254) (0.00387)
EQt−d × Dist2 -0.00284*** -0.00409*** -0.00456*** -0.00261*** -0.00253***
(0.000636) (0.000593) (0.000617) (0.000405) (0.000610)
EQt−d × Dist3 0.0000797** 0.000142*** 0.000163*** 0.0000966*** 0.0000783**
(0.0000264) (0.0000245) (0.0000252) (0.0000170) (0.0000253)
Observations 119816 119816 119816 119102 112153
Overall R-squared 0.711 0.675 0.433 0.778 0.457
Within R-squared 0.678 0.682 0.733 0.522
Between R-squared 0.687 0.280 0.826 0.423
Region fixed effects Yes Yes No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Environmental controls Yes Yes No No No
Hausman test 801.2***
Endogeneity test 40.62***
Notes - The table presents regression results for the log of per capita local government expenditure. Model 1 is a
pooled OLS regression, model 2 a random effects regression, models 3 and 4 are fixed effects regressions, and model
5 is a two-stage fixed effects regression where log transfers are instrumented with the second lag of log average
transfers received by neighboring municipalities. EQt−d is a dummy variable equal to 1 measuring the occurrence
of the latest earthquake within the last 15 years, and 0 otherwise. 1 < d 6 15 measures the temporal distance from
the latest earthquake. All models control for financial time-variant (logs of per capita transfers from the central and
regional governments and revenues from local taxation), political (center-right government, vote concentration, term
limit, years before elections), socioeconomic (average income and % of low-income population) and sociodemographic
factors (population density, % of young and % of old population), and year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 further
control for environmental characteristics (mountain, partial mountain and coastal jurisdiction) and region fixed
effects, which are time-invariant, and model 4 for the lag of the dependent variable. Significance levels: ***
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered by municipality.
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Table 3: Impact of earthquakes on local government expenditure and transfers by year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Euro per capita
Exp. Transf. Exp. Transf.
EQt 0.0280*** 0.0900*** 38.84 62.66
(0.00835) (0.0226)
EQt−1 0.0746*** 0.162*** 117.2 110.1
(0.00941) (0.0232)
EQt−2 0.0664*** 0.206*** 114.0 157.7
(0.00899) (0.0238)
EQt−3 0.0616*** 0.221*** 95.84 174.3
(0.00831) (0.0227)
EQt−4 0.0616*** 0.248*** 102.7 235.2
(0.00814) (0.0231)
EQt−5 0.0771*** 0.196*** 135.6 137.5
(0.00854) (0.0190)
EQt−6 0.0688*** 0.210*** 129.7 146.9
(0.00843) (0.0193)
EQt−7 0.0416*** 0.134*** 73.49 88.13
(0.00727) (0.0176)
EQt−8 0.0313*** 0.0651*** 53.43 41.90
(0.00686) (0.0185)
EQt−9 0.0333*** 0.0771*** 54.28 46.17
(0.00644) (0.0173)
EQt−10 0.0251*** 0.0192 36.67 11.41
(0.00576) (0.0162)
EQt−11 0.00791 -0.0189 11.62 -11.03
(0.00529) (0.0145)
Observations 119816 119837
Overall R-squared 0.434 0.121
Within R-squared 0.682 0.370
Between R-squared 0.282 0.0319
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Financial time-variant controls Yes No
Political controls Yes Yes
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes
Notes - The table presents fixed effects regression results for the log of per capita local government expenditure
(column 1) and the log of per capita transfers from central and regional governments (column 2). Columns 3 and
4 transform regression results in real per capita values. EQt−j , with 0 6 j 6 11, is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the latest earthquake occurred j years before the current year, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 controls for financial
time-variant factors (logs of per capita transfers from the central and regional governments and revenues from local
taxation), and both models control for political (center-right government, vote concentration, term limit, years
before elections), socioeconomic (average income and % of low-income population) and sociodemographic factors
(population density, % of young and % of old population), and year fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001,
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered by municipality.
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Table 4: Flypaper effect and asymmetric response to variations in transfers.
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE IV
Earthquake-specific grants 0.275*** 0.290*** 0.245**
(0.0798) (0.0802) (0.0846)
Asymmetry (Eq.-specific grants) -0.242*** -0.215***
(0.0443) (0.0482)
General grants 0.658*** 0.747*** 1.640**
(0.0500) (0.0445) (0.588)
Asymmetry (General grants) -0.337*** -0.0336
(0.0285) (0.670)
Income 0.0521*** 0.0427*** 0.0422***
(0.00769) (0.00689) (0.00991)
Observations 119816 111825 103681
Overall R-squared 0.262 0.300 0.524
Within R-squared 0.248 0.241 0.0259
Between R-squared 0.268 0.321 0.649
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Hausman test -11636.1
Endogeneity test 21.61***
Notes - The table presents regression results for per capita local government expenditure. Models 1 and 2 are OLS
regressions and model 3 is a two-stage least square regression where general grants and the relative asymmetry
variable are instrumented with the second lag of general grants and the second lag of general grants of neighboring
municipalities (2-years spatial lag). Matching grants are earthquake-specific per capita transfers from central and
regional governments allocated for recovery after the occurrence of an earthquake. Unconditional grants are general
grants obtained as the difference between total grants and earthquake-specific grants. The two asymmetry variables
measure decreases of each type of transfers between period t− 1 and t. All models control for financial-time variant
characteristics (per capita revenues from local taxation), political (center-right government, vote concentration, term
limit, years before elections), socioeconomic (average income and % of low-income population) and sociodemographic
factors (population density, % of young and % of old population), municipality and year fixed effects. All values
are expressed at 2010 prices. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust and clustered by municipality.
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Table 5: Impact of transfers on local government expenditure by macro regions.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample North and Center South
Earthquake-specific grants 1.455** 0.686*** 0.128**
(0.501) (0.134) (0.0408)
South × Earthquake-specific grants -1.234*
(0.505)
Earthquake-specific grants (t− 1) 1.129* 0.154***
(0.511) (0.0379)
Earthquake-specific grants (t− 2) 1.414 0.308***
(0.778) (0.0436)
General grants 0.645*** 0.756*** 0.786***
(0.0572) (0.0505) (0.0391)
South × General grants 0.0761
(0.0613)
Income 0.0521*** 0.0451*** 0.0731***
(0.00761) (0.00973) (0.0208)
Observations 119816 74587 29253
Overall R-squared 0.271 0.394 0.483
Within R-squared 0.258 0.220 0.409
Between R-squared 0.276 0.457 0.525
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Financial time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes - The table presents fixed effects regression results for per capita local government expenditure. Model 1 uses
the full sample of observations, model 2 uses the sub-sample of municipalities located in the regions in the Northern
and Central regions, and model 3 uses the sub-sample of municipalities located in the Southern regions (Abruzzo,
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily). Matching grants are earthquake-specific per capita transfers
from central and regional governments, allocated for recovery after the occurrence of an earthquake. Unconditional
grants are general transfers calculated as the difference between total grants and earthquake-specific grants. The
two asymmetry variables measure decreases of each type of transfers between period t− 1 and t. South is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for municipality located in the Southern regions of Italy. All models control for financial-time
variant characteristics (per capita revenues from local taxation), political (center-right government, vote concen-
tration, term limit, years before elections), socioeconomic (average income and % of low-income population) and
sociodemographic factors (population density, % of young and % of old population), and year fixed effects. Signifi-
cance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered by
municipality.
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Table 6: Variation (in %) of spending composition after an earthquake.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before After
North South ∆ North ∆ South ∆ North - ∆ South
Local services 19.34 25.94 2.32*** 5.10*** -2.78***
General administration 30.93 32.36 0.96* -0.80 1.76**
Education 11.02 7.90 -0.84*** -0.32 -0.52
Social protection 11.82 6.72 -1.65*** -0.22 -1.42***
Transport services 13.44 12.25 0.38 -0.65* 1.03**
Other services 13.05 14.75 -0.94** -3.04*** 2.10***
Observations 911 951 3587 2572
The table reports budget shares (columns 1 and 2) allocated to the main local government spending categories in the
five years before a shock (with intensity > 5) and average variations (in %) within five years after the occurrence of
the shock (columns 3 and 4). Southern municipalities include the regions of Abruzzo, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata,
Calabria and Sicily. Stars in columns 3 and 4 indicate significance levels of t-tests on differences in means before
and after the shock. Column 5 reports mean differences between variations in the North and the South, and stars
indicate significance levels of t-tests on mean differences. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Figure 1: Frequency of earthquakes by municipality (1985-2015).
Notes - The map represents the frequency of earthquakes with intensity >5 by municipality for a 31-year period
(1985-2015). The darker the color, the higher the frequency. White areas represent municipalities that did not face
any earthquake with intensity >5 over the period.
Source: Our elaboration on data from the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al., 2016). The shape map of the
2016 administrative borders is provided by ISTAT.
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Figure 2: Per capita local government expenditure over time (2000-2015).
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Notes - The graph compares the average per capita local government expenditure for the period 2000-2015 of 2658
municipalities struck by at least one earthquake with intensity >5 over the period 1985-2015 (red solid line) with
5339 municipalities not struck by an earthquake over the same period (blue dashed line).
Source: Our elaboration on balance sheet data of Italian local governments for the period 2000-2015 provided by
the Italian Ministry of Interior and data from the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al., 2016).
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Figure 3: Expenditure variation after the occurrence of an earthquake.
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Notes - The graph compares the average per capita local government expenditure before and after the occurrence
of an earthquake, which occurs at time 0, with expenditure of matched municipalities (without an earthquake) in
the same year. Treatment is assigned if an earthquake with intensity >5 occurred over the period 2000-2015. The
red solid line represents 517 treated municipalities, while the blue dashed line represents 517 matched municipali-
ties identified with coarsened exact matching performed on average pre-treatment characteristics of municipalities
(institutional, sociodemographic, and environmental). Both groups include only municipalities with complete ex-
penditure data for the period 2000-2015. Positive (negative) values on the x -axis indicate years after (before) the
treatment.
Source: Our elaboration on balance sheet data of Italian local governments for the period 2000-2015 provided by
the Italian Ministry of Interior and data from the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al., 2016).
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Figure 4: Variation of local government expenditure and transfers after an earthquake.
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Notes - The graph represents the estimates of the impact of an earthquake with intensity >5 on per capita local
government expenditure (blue solid line) and per capita transfers of financial resources from central and regional
governments (red dashed line) for a 12-year period after the occurrence of an earthquake. Vertical blue dashed and
red dotted segments are 95% confidence intervals for the estimates of expenditure and transfers respectively. Local
government expenditure is adjusted for time-variant financial, political, socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors,
and municipality and time fixed effects. Transfers are adjusted for time-variant socioeconomic and sociodemographic
factors, and municipality and time fixed effects.
Source: Our elaboration on socioeconomic and sociodemographic data of ISTAT, local government balance sheet
data provided by the Italian Home Office, and data on earthquakes of the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al.,
2016).
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Figure 5: Economic outcomes after the occurrence of an earthquake.
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(c) Housing prices (North)
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(d) Housing prices (South)
Notes - The graphs illustrate personal income (Figure (a) for Northern municipalities and Figure (b) for Southern
municipalities) and mean housing prices per square meter (Figure (c) for Northern municipalities and Figure (d)
for Southern municipalities) before and after the occurrence of an earthquake with intensity >5, which occurs at
time 0. The top figures compare municipalities struck by an earthquake over the period 2000-2015 (treated group -
red solid line) with matched unaffected municipalities (blue dashed line) identified with coarsened exact matching
performed on average pre-treatment characteristics of municipalities (institutional, socioeconomic, financial, sociode-
mographic). The bottom figures compare municipalities struck by an earthquake over the period 2003-2015 with
matched unaffected municipalities identified with coarsened exact matching performed on average pre-treatment
housing prices. Both groups include only municipalities with complete data for the respective period. Positive
(negative) values on the x -axis indicate years (or semesters for housing prices) after (before) the treatment.
Source: Our elaboration on income data provided by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance, data on housing
pries provided by the Real Estate Market Observatory of the Italian Revenue Agency, and data on earthquakes of
the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al., 2016).
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Figure 6: Variation of municipal financial characteristics after an earthquake.
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(c) Budget share for local services (North)
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(d) Budget share for local services (South)
Notes - The graphs illustrate per capita transfers from central and regional governments (Figure (a) for Northern
municipalities and Figure (b) for Southern municipalities) and the budget share allocated to local services (Figure
(c) for Northern municipalities and Figure (d) for Southern municipalities) before and after the occurrence of an
earthquake with intensity >5, which occurs at time 0. Each graph compares municipalities struck by an earthquake
over the period 2000-2015 (treated group - red solid line) with matched unaffected municipalities (blue dashed
line) identified with coarsened exact matching performed on average pre-treatment characteristics of municipalities
(institutional, socioeconomic, financial,sociodemographic). Both groups include only municipalities with complete
data for the period 2000-2015. Positive (negative) values on the x -axis indicate years after (before) the treatment.
Source: Our elaboration on local government balance sheet data provided by the Italian Home Office, and data on
earthquakes of the DBMI15 database of INGV (Locati et al., 2016).
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Appendix
A.1 Matching approach
To construct a counterfactual group of municipalities, we apply a matching procedure
starting from the full sample of 1129 municipalities struck at least once by an earthquake
over the period 2000-2015. We exclude 252 municipalities affected by an earthquake in year
2000 because we lack data on pre-treatment characteristics before that year. Moreover,
we keep only municipalities with complete data for the period 2000-2015. The resulting
sub-sample of treated municipalities is composed of 743 units.
To build an equal-sized control group of municipalities not struck by earthquakes,
we use the remaining 5339 municipalities with complete data for the period 2000-2015.
Since geographical proximity may be not sufficient to build a control group with similar
institutional characteristics in the pre-treatment period, especially if contiguous munici-
palities are located in other regions, we build a control based on institutional proximity,
intended as similarity in institutional factors.40 To this aim, we force the matching with
municipalities in the same region. This procedure guarantees that matched municipalities
are subject to the same institutional setting and have little geographical discontinuity.
Other municipality characteristics that we match are pre-treatment averages of transfers
of financial resources from the central government and from the regions, personal income
population size (less or greater than 15,000 people) and the budget share allocated to local
services.
To perform the matching we use the coarsened exact matching (CEM) applied with the
cem command in Stata 13 developed by Blackwell et al. (2009). The advantage of CEM
compared to other matching procedures is that the matching imbalance is lower, model
dependence and bias in postmatching estimation are reduced, and efficiency is improved.
Since the treatment occurs at different points in time for different municipalities, we repeat
the matching procedure for each period between 2001 and 2015 by allowing replacement
of matched untreated municipalities. We do not impose any custom restrictions on the
cutpoints that define the coarsening and use the standards. Since we want exact matching
to occur on the region, we repeat the CEM algorithm for each regional sub-sample.
CEM was able to match 517 municipalities out of the 743 treated municipalities. In-
40Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) construct a control group of municipalities using geographical proximity
as a proxy for the similarity of treated and controlled municipalities to analyze social interactions in high
school after an earthquake. While the schooling system is mostly centralized, local institutional aspects
related to spending levels and funding sources may be quite heterogeneous, especially across regions.
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deed, t-tests on mean differences show that matching characteristics and per capita local
government expenditure are not significantly different between the two groups before the
occurrence of an earthquake (see columns 1 and 2 of Table A.1 below). Conversely, aver-
age characteristics of the universe of municipalities (column 3) differ significantly from the
characteristics of the treated group, except for population size and budget share allocated
to local services.
Table A.1: Balancing properties resulting from the matching approach.
(1) (2) (3)
Treated Matched All unaffected
Expenditure p/c 1167.6 1196.9 1508.6***
Transfers p/c 447.2 447.0 548.8***
Income 11081.1 11055.2 11808.6***
Population 6463.5 7067.9 6264.4
Local services 21.38 21.43 21.74
Observations 3458 3458 84967
Notes - The table reports mean characteristics of 611 municipalities struck by an earthquake with intensity >5
(column 1) and their matched unaffected municipalities (column 2) before the occurrence of an earthquake, and of
the universe of unaffected municipalities for the period 2000-2015 (column 3). Except for expenditure, the reported
characteristics are those used to build the group of matched municipalities (institutional proximity is omitted because
of exact matching on that characteristic - see Section A.1). Stars in column 3 indicate significance levels of t-tests on
mean differences between column 1 and 3. t-tests on mean differences between column 1 and 2 reveal not significant
differences for all characteristics. Significance level: *** p < 0.001. Currency values are discounted at 2010 prices.
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Table A.2: Impact of earthquakes on local government expenditure using the matching
sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS RE FE FE (AR1)
EQt 0.0253 0.0252* 0.0241* 0.0339***
(0.0146) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0102)
EQt−1 0.0595*** 0.0664*** 0.0670*** 0.0675***
(0.0154) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0112)
EQt−d × Dist 0.0132 0.0217*** 0.0228*** 0.0134***
(0.00688) (0.00614) (0.00640) (0.00396)
EQt−d × Dist2 -0.000681 -0.00228* -0.00246* -0.00150*
(0.00110) (0.00100) (0.00102) (0.000655)
EQt−d × Dist3 -0.0000209 0.0000507 0.0000570 0.0000375
(0.0000490) (0.0000447) (0.0000451) (0.0000298)
Observations 15789 15789 15789 15789
Overall R-squared 0.661 0.639 0.387 0.746
Within R-squared 0.689 0.691 0.753
Between R-squared 0.597 0.157 0.739
Region fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sociodemographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Environmental controls Yes Yes No No
Notes - The table presents regression results for the log of per capita local government expenditure using a sample
composed by 517 treated and 517 matched municipalities identified with coarsened exact matching (cem command
in Stata 13) on average pre-treatment institutional, sociodemographic, and environmental characteristics. Model
1 is an OLS regression, model 2 a random effects regressions, and models 3 and 4 are fixed effects regressions.
EQt−d is a dummy variable equal to 1 measuring the occurrence of the latest earthquake within the last 15 years,
and 0 otherwise. 1 < d 6 15 measures the temporal distance from the latest earthquake. All models control for
financial time-variant (logs of per capita transfers from the central and regional governments and revenues from local
taxation), political (center-right government, vote concentration, term limit, years before elections), socioeconomic
(average income and % of low-income population) and sociodemographic factors (population density, % of young
and % of old population), and year fixed effects. Models 1 and 2 further control for environmental characteristics
(mountain, partial mountain and coastal jurisdiction) and region fixed effects, which are time-invariant, and model
4 for the lag of the dependent variable. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are robust and clustered by municipality.
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Figure A.1: Local government expenditure (2000-2015).
Notes - The map shows the average per capita local government expenditure in Euro by municipality for a 16-year
period (2000-2015). The darker the color, the higher the expenditure per individual.
Source: Our elaboration on balance sheet data of Italian local governments for the period 2000-2015 provided by
the Ministry of Interior. The shapemap of the 2016 administrative borders is provided by ISTAT.
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